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Case No. 960656-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (URCrP), which allows the 
prosecution to appeal from a final order of dismissal, the State of Utah appeals the trial court's 
dismissal of this case. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the appeal is taken from a 
criminal case in a court of record. §78-2a-3(f) Utah Code Annotated (UCA). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In this appeal, the State raises these two issues: (1) May an order of dismissal be construed 
as a dismissal with prejudice if it does not explicitly so state?; and (2) May a trial court issue a 
dismissal with prejudice if the criminal defendant has made no showing that a bar to further 
prosecution is the only way in which he may be treated fairly? These issues concern questions of 
law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). These issues 
were preserved for review by the State in its memorandum in support of its motion for 
reconsideration submitted on August 9,1996. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, at appendix A. The trial court thereafter declined to hear further argument 
regarding the issues raised in the State's motion for reconsideration,and instead executed its final 
order of dismissal on October 2,1996. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Dismissal, at appendix B. 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
This appeal does not directly implicate any specific statutory or constitutional construction, 
but rather it regards the construction to be given to Rules 16 and 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (hereinafter URCrP). URCrP 16 addresses discovery in criminal cases, and URCrP 25 
addresses the dismissal of criminal cases without trial. In relevant part, these rules provide: 
"If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention 
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule [pertaining to 
discovery], the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, 
or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
URCrP 16(g) (emphasis added). 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the court 
may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, order an 
information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing the defendant to 
trial... 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered 
into the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon grounds that there was unreasonable delay,... 
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred... 
URCrP 25 (emphasis added). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal taken by the State from a final order of dismissal of a criminal information 
entered by Judge L. A. Dever of Division II of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County. 
Statement of the Facts 
On May 17,1995, the defendant, Paul Burningham, was arrested for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol and for driving on a revoked license. Charges arising from this incident 
were filed by the State on May 30,1995, and the case was assigned to Judge Phillip K. Palmer with 
the case number 955017625 TC. As the case progressed toward trial, the State encountered some 
difficulty in obtaining a video cassette recording of the arrest because the Highway Patrol trooper 
had been reassigned from Salt Lake County to Green River, Utah. On October 23,1995, Judge 
Palmer heard the defendant' s motion pertaining to a complaint that the State had committed a 
discovery violation by its failure to provide the tape. In that motion, the defendant did not seek to 
continue the trial so he could view the tape, or seek the tape's exclusion as evidence in the State's 
case-in-chief, but rather he sought as his exclusive remedy the dismissal of the case. Judge Palmer 
denied the defendant's motion, but the State was ordered to complete discovery within five days. 
Docket for case 955017625 TC, at appendix C. The State was unable to obtain the video within 
that time, and the State therefore submitted a motion to dismiss on October 31. See State's Motion 
to Dismiss, at appendix C. The State's motion explicitly sought that the dismissal be without 
prejudice. Id. The order of dismissal was executed by the Court on November 1,1995. See Order 
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of Dismissal, at appendix E. Nothing in the order of dismissal stated that it was intended to have 
any effect contrary to the State's motion that the case be dismissed without prejudice. Id. 
On November 27,1995, after obtaining the tape, the State re-filed charges and the case was 
assigned to Judge Dever with case number 955039908 TC. The case then progressed toward trial 
until May of 1996 before the defendant filed the motion for dismissal before Judge Dever. See 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, at appendix F. In that motion, the defendant asserted that Rule 41 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure barred the re-filing of a case once it had been voluntarily 
dismissed, and that the State had voluntarily dismissed this case by its motion of October 31,1995. 
Id. The defendant further asserted that he was entitled to attorney's fees as a result of the State's 
renewing of the case. Id. Argument was heard by Judge Dever on August 5,1996, and although 
Judge Dever agreed with the State that the defendant erroneously relied on the Rules of Civil 
Procedure since URCrP 25 specifically addressed the dismissal of criminal cases without trial, the 
judge nevertheless raised sua sponte the issue that Judge Palmer may have intended that his order of 
dismissal be construed as a bar to further prosecution; he then ruled that the earlier dismissal had 
been with prejudice because the State had not submitted its motion for dismissal-without-prejudice 
until more than five days after Judge Palmer directed the State to complete discovery. Judge Dever 
later declined the State's motion to reconsider his ruling. The written order of dismissal prescribed 
by URCrP 25(c) was executed on October 2,1996. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order of Dismissal, at appendix B. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State argues that the dismissal-with-prejudice was entered in error for these two 
reasons: (1) The order of dismissal entered by Judge Palmer and construed by Judge Dever did not 
explicitly state that it would bar further prosecution, and was not accompanied by any statement of 
reasons that would support a dismissal-with-prejudice, moreover, it was issued incident to the 
State's motion to dismiss without prejudice, therefore the State was unfairly surprised by Judge 
Dever's ruling; and (2) The defendant was never entitled to a dismissal-with-prejudice because 
less severe remedies would have afforded him a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Pursuant to URCrP 25(c), Orders of Dismissal Should be Construed as 
Without Prejudice Unless Otherwise Explicitly Stated, 
The rule governing the procedures to be followed in the dismissal of criminal cases without 
trial is exclusively contained in URCrP 25. Rule 25(c) requires that orders of dismissal must be 
accompanied by a statement of the reasons for dismissal, and this provision has been construed by 
the Utah Court of Appeals as warranting the vacation of an order of dismissal for not recording 
specific findings. Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Ligh, 912 P.2d 452,456 (Utah App. 1996). 
In Dorman-Ligh, the issue on appeal concerned dismissal-with-prejudice as the sanction for 
actions the trial court characterized as prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 454. Although the Court of 
Appeals held in Dorman-Ligh that the trial court had erroneously determined that it had issued a 
binding order to the prosecutor, the court went on to criticize the trial court's elected sanction, 
stating: 
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"Dismissal of a criminal information as a sanction against the prosecutor is rarely 
appropriate, even if the prosecutor is in contempt of court. A dismissal can only be 
entered pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 25(a) 
provides for dismissal, in the trial court's discretion, "for substantial cause and in 
the furtherance of justice." Utah R.Crim.P. 25(a). Rule 25 (b) mandates dismissal 
for "unreasonable or unconstitutional delay" and for other very specific reasons. 
Utah R.Crim.P. 25(b). In the rare case in which the trial court dismisses a criminal 
information because of misbehavior by the prosecutor, the court must enter findings 
that carefully specify which Rule 25 provisions it relied upon. See Utah R.Crim.P. 
25(c) ("The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered 
in the minutes"). 
Id. at 456 (emphasis added). 
The State acknowledges that Dorman-Ligh was not published until after Judge Palmer's 
order of dismissal was entered. The State asserts, however, that Judge Dever erred in failing to 
construe the order of dismissal in light of Dorman-Ligh's guidance. This is so because without a 
statement of specific findings justifying a dismissal-with-prejudice, the State is not afforded notice 
that the clock has begun to run with respect to the State's right to take an appeal-as-of-right from a 
final order of the court. Such a result as was reached by Judge Dever is particularly harsh under the 
facts of this case, where the order of dismissal had been issued incident to the State's motion to 
dismiss without prejudice, and where that order was executed by Judge Palmer without any further 
comment. If a dismissal may be construed as with prejudice even if it does not explicitly so state, 
then the State is placed in a substantially unfair position. 
1
 The State acknowledges that it was within the power of the State to have drafted its original order of dismissal to 
explicitly state that it was without prejudice, and thus render this question moot, but even so, as set forth in part two 
of this argument, because the defendant was never entitled to dismissal-with-prejudice, Judge Dever should not have 
construed Judge Palmer's order to have granted the defendant any relief to which he was not entitled. 
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IL The Defendant was Never Entitled to a Dismissal-With-Prejudice. 
A. The Defendant had a Duty to Mitigate. 
As quoted above, this Court has stated that it is the rare circumstance when dismissal is an 
appropriate remedy for prosecutorial misconduct—even if the prosecutor acts in contempt of court. 
Id. This view of the law is consistent with the position taken in cases where the prosecutor has 
failed to provide complete or timely discovery. These cases, as illustrated below, stand together for 
the proposition that a defendant has an affirmative obligation to mitigate any violation of the rules 
of discovery that might be encountered, and a defendant is only entitled to the remedy of dismissal-
with-prejudice if no lesser remedy would afford a fair trial. 
In State v.Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988), the prosecutor failed to disclose to defense 
counsel statements made by the defendant to an investigating officer until shortly before trial. Id. at 
882. Those statements were inconsistent with the account offered by an alibi witness, and when the 
prosecutor offered the statements to rebut the alibi, the defense counsel objected; when the 
statements were admitted over the objection, the defendant moved for a mistrial. Id. In reviewing 
the issue raised by the defendant on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's 
appropriate remedy for the untimely disclosure of the statements was to obtain a continuance—to 
which he would have been entitled—so he could review his trial strategy in light of the challenge to 
the alibi. Id. at 883. Because the defendant did not seek this remedy, and instead he sought a 
harsher remedy to which he was not entitled, he waived the relief otherwise available to him. Id. 
In State v. Christoffersou 793 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1990), on the morning of trial the 
prosecutor learned of exculpatory statements of the defendant that contradicted an earlier 
7 
confession, but the statements were not disclosed to defense counsel. Id. at 947. The defendant did 
not learn of the statements until they were introduced as testimony. Id. At that time, the defense 
! 
counsel did not object, move for a continuance, or request a mistrial, but rather the witness was 
allowed to testify on direct examination, and then cross-examined, before the defense submitted a 
motion to dismiss for the failure to sooner disclose the exculpatory statement. Id. Finding that the 
defendant failed to mitigate the prosecutor's discovery violation by not seeking one of the specific 
remedies afforded by Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court held 
that the defendant had waived all relief. Id. at 948. Specifically, the Court stated: "Dismissal is 
proper only when all other attempts to mitigate damage caused by unexpected evidence have 
failed" Id. (Emphasis added). 
The defendant in this case did not comport himself with this Utah case law by seeking to 
mitigate a discovery violation, but rather he tried to exploit the circumstance in order to 
manufacture a de facto acquittal without risking a resolution of the case on the merits. Pursuant to 
Griffiths and Christofferson however, by engaging in this ploy, the defendant should not profit, but 
rather he should be viewed as having waived any claim of prejudice whatsoever. This was the 
position urged by the State at the August 2,1996, hearing. Finding #8, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, at appendix B. This is the correct application of law. 
B. The Defendant was Never Denied the Opportunity to Have a Fair Trial. 
If the defendant had argued that he believed the undisclosed tape might have proved 
exculpatory,2 or otherwise necessary to his defense, then URCrP 16(g) provides remedies other 
2
 An issue which is moot, since the tape is now available to the defendant. 
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than dismissal. He may have sought a continuance until he was afforded an opportunity to obtain 
the missing material. Christofferson, supra. He could have also sought the tape's exclusion. See, 
e.g., State v. Kull 688 P.2d 1327 (Ore. 1984) (defendant entitled to suppression of video tape 
which was not provided in discovery until four days before trial). Otherwise, if he could not wait 
because his ability to mount his defense would deteriorate over time, he should have made this 
argument to Judge Palmer rather than waiting another five months before renewing his attempt to 
dismiss this case before Judge Dever. By not making these arguments, the State submits that the 
defendant was never concerned with whether or not this case was delayed, and therefore he has 
never suffered any prejudice resulting from the tape not being available in October of 1995. 
However, assuming, arguendo, that the defendant can articulate that he would have been 
prejudiced by a continuance in October of 1995, the State asserts that absent an argument that the 
State acted in bad faith by suppressing the tape, the defendant was never entitled to demand that the 
prosecutor produce a tape not within its control or suffer a bar to further prosecution. See Arizona 
v. Youngblood 488 U.S. 51,102 L.Ed.2d281,109 S.Ct. 333,reh. den. 488 U.S. 1051,102 
L.Ed.2d 1007,109 S.Ct. 885 (1988). Rather, his most immediate remedy would have been going to 
trial without the tape. 
In Youngblood investigators negligently stored semen samples and clothing in such a 
manner that the items were later useless for the performance of tests that would have tended to 
prove or disprove the defendant's identity as the abductor of a ten-year-old boy who had been 
sexually assaulted. Id. at 52-5,102 L.Ed.2d at 285-7. On this issue, the United States Supreme 
Court noted that the defendant had raised no claim that the State had acted in bad faith in causing 
9 
the potential evidence to be unavailable for the defendant's use, and the Court further noted that the 
defendant could say no more of the evidence than that it might have proved exculpatory. Id. at 57, 
102 L.Ed.2d at 289. Noting precedent set forth in California v. Trombetta 467 U.S. 479,81 
L.Ed.2d 413,104 S.Ct 2528 (1984) (holding that DUI defendant was not denied a fair trial for 
failure to preserve breath test samples which were destroyed in good faith), the Youngblood Court 
held that "...unless the criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to 
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Id. at 58, 
102 L.Ed.2d at 289 (emphasis added). In this case, like in Youngblood the defendant has raised no 
argument that the State suppressed evidence in bad faith. 
Moreover, unlike in Youngblood in this case the evidence was never irretrievably lost, but 
rather the State merely encountered a delay in causing its production. Noting that URCrP 25(b)( 1) 
specifically allows for the dismissal of a case for unreasonable delay, and that URCrP 25(d). 
provides that a dismissal for unreasonable delay shall not bar further prosecution, the defendant 
may be viewed as having been given a proper remedy by the dismissal without prejudice to avoid 
additional unreasonable delay. 
3
 The State acknowledges that the defendant would be entitled to a dismissal-with-prejudice if the trial court had 
found that there had been an unconstitutional delay. See URCrP 25(d). This issue is foreclosed, though, because 
Judge Dever's findings of fact include the finding that the defendant did not complain of delay. Finding #7, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, at appendix B. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that it is error to construe an order of dismissal as a bar to further 
prosecution unless the order is accompanied by specific findings supporting the remedy of 
dismissal-with-prejudice as prescribed by Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 
Court should further hold that the interests of justice are not promoted when a defendant pursues 
dismissal rather than a fair resolution of the case on its merits, and therefore a defendant is not 
entitled to dismissal as a remedy unless he makes a showing that no other remedy would afford him 
a fair trial. In this case, the defendant has not sought a leveling of the playing field to ensure that he 
will receive a fair trial on the merits; rather, he has instead sought to manipulate a factor beyond 
the prosecutor's control for the purpose of avoiding trial. On these facts, and from the holdings 
urged above, the State prays that the Court rule that this case was dismissed in error and remand 
this case for an expeditious trial. 
Respectfully submitted this _/^ _ day of February, 1997 fl'%> 
E.NEALGUNN ARSON 
Salt Lake District Attorney, by 
STEPHEN MERCER, 
Deputy District Attorney 
1 1 
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Salt Lake County Attorney 
STEPHEN MERCER, Bar No. 6931 
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The State of Utah, by and through its codnsel, Stephen Mercer, submits this 
memorandum in support of its motion that thejCourt reconsider its ruling of August 5, 
1996, and rescind its order dismissing this case with prejudice. 
FACTS 
In October of 1995, due to events beyond me control of the prosecutor in this 
case, the State failed to make discovery materials available to the defendant pertaining 
to his May, 1995, arrest for DUI. These materials, more specifically a video tape, 
would be valuable evidence at trial, but the State could have presented its case without 
the video. Rather than seeking the suppression of the video at trial, or seeking a 
continuance if the defense felt the video might prove exculpatory, or even arguing that 
a continuance would further prejudice the defense, the defendant instead argued that he 
was entitled to a dismissal with prejudice as the remedy for prosecutorial misconduct. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTIOOTOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case Nb. 955039908TC 
Hon7. LEE DEVER 
Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration 
State v. Buraingham 
Page 2 
Such a motion was initially denied by Judge Palmer, and when the State could not 
obtain the video without further delay, and before he entertained another motion by the 
defendant, Judge Palmer executed an order of dismissal proposed by the State's motion 
to dismiss without prejudice. 
The State refiled the case shortly after the original dismissal without any 
complaint by the defendant until the case had progressed another six months. The 
defendant then submitted a memorandum in which he argued that the original dismissal 
should be viewed as an involuntary dismissal against the State pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore the State should be barred from further 
proceedings and ordered to pay costs. At the hearing on the motion on August 5, 
1996, the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
should apply, but, contrary to the order of dismissal pursuant to the State's motion to 
dismiss without prejudice, and contrary the State's argument that the defendant was 
never entitled to a dismissal with prejudice, the Court ruled that the original dismissal 
had been with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
At the hearing on the motion in this matter, the State and defense each invested 
a considerable portion of the oral argument to the issue of the applicability of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which the Court found the defendant relied upon erroneously. The 
State also argued that the order executed by Judge Palmer was proposed by the State in 
its motion to dismiss without prejudice, but this point was not belabored. It was 
further argued that the defendant was never entitled to a dismissal with prejudice for 
the complained of discovery violation, but rather the remedy he should have sought was 
the suppression of the video tape from trial. Although these arguments were not found 
Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration 
State v. Burningham 
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persuasive by the Court at the time of oral arguments, the State now presents the Court 
with this memorandum to show the authority favoring the reinstatement of this 
prosecution before executing a final order of dismissal, 
I. Pursuant to Rule 25(c), Judge Palmer could not have responded 
to the State's Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice with a 
Dismissal With Prejudice Without Explicitly Saying So 
If the effect of Judge Palmer's order of dismissal of this case was to dismiss this 
case with prejudice, then this was an appealable order order pursuant to Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the State should have been placed on notice of 
this pursuant to Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 25(c) 
requires that orders of dismissal be accompanied by a statement of the reasons 
therefore. See Salt Lake Citv v. Dorman-Ligh. 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996) 
(construing Rule 25(c)). Where the order in question is accompanied by no 
contemporaneous statement of reasons contradictory to the State's motion for dismissal 
without prejudice, the dismissal cannot be viewed as entered for any purpose other than 
that stated in the motion. See ]d-, at 456. Moreover, uIn the rare case in which the 
trial court dismisses a criminal information because of the misbehavior of a 
prosecutor, the court must enter findings that carefully specify which Rule 25 
provisions it relied upon." Id. (Emphasis added). 
II. The Defendant had a Duty to Mitigate his Injury 
The State next addresses whether dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate 
remedy if any lesser remedy would relieve the prejudice, if any occured. The State 
submits that any prejudice that may have flowed from the delay in providing discovery 
of the video tape did not significantly hamper the defendant's preparation of his defense 
Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration 
State v. Burningham 
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because the tape only depicts an event in which the defendant was a participant, and 
which both the defendant and the arresting officer can testify. As a participant himself, 
the defendant should be able to inform his counsel of the contents of the tape so that its 
preview would not be a necessary prerequisite for trial preparation. 
Moreover, even if the Court views the preview of the tape as a necessity in the 
defendant's preparation for trial, the Court cannot view the introduction of the video 
tape as essential to case against the defendant because many, if not most, DUI trials 
proceed in the absence of such video taped evidence. Therefore, this case could have 
proceeded to trial without prejudice to the defenant simply by ordering the tape 
inadmissible in the State's case in chief. See State v. Kull. 688 P.2d 1327 (Ore. 1984) 
(defendant entitled to suppression of video tape which was requested in discovery but 
which was not produced until four days before trial). Accordingly, since the defendant 
could have mitigated the effect of not previewing the tape by obtaining an order of 
suppression, he was not entitled to any other relief pursuant to Rule 16(g) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947-8 (Utah 
App. 1990), State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1988).. 
In Christofferson, a police detecitive brought to the prosecutor's attention on the 
day of trial a material statement of the defendant, but the prosecutor did not make this 
known to the defense until the witness recounted the statement in his testimony. Upon 
hearing the statement, defense counsel did not object, move for a continuance, or move 
for a mistrial, but rather he later moved for a dismissal with prejudice as the remedy 
for prosecutorial misconduct. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and on the 
defendant's appeal the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court by holding that a 
defendant has a duty to mitigate the affect of a discovery violation, and if he pursues a 
Memo re: Motion for Reconsideration 
State v. Burningham 
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dismissal where a less harsh remedy would relieve the prejudice, then he waives the 
claim of prejudice. Id. 
This rule continues the line of reasoning employed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Griffiths. In Griffiths, the defendant was confronted just before trial with statements 
attributed to him which had not been disclosed earlier in discovery because a police 
investigator had not provided them to the prosecutor. These statements were pivotal to 
the defense because they contradicted the account of an alibi witness. Rather than 
moving for a continuance before trial to re-evaluate the defense that would be 
presented, the defendant objected to the admission of the statements, and when they 
were admitted, he moved for a mistrial. Just like the holding in Christofferson. the 
Supreme Court held in Griffiths that the defendant's failure to timely seek a less harsh 
remedy which would adequately relieve the prejudice operated as a waiver of any relief 
under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Griffiths at 883. 
Applying the reasoning of Christofferson and Griffiths to this case, the State 
argues that because this trial could have gone forward without any prejudice to the 
defendant if the video at issue were never introduced by the State, and because the 
defendant has not pursued this remedy, but rather he has pursued a dismissal with 
prejudice, he has failed to mitigate the discovery violation and accordingly he has 
waived any right to relief under Rule 16(g) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the rules established by State v. Christofferson and State v. 
Griffiths, the defendant was not entitled to pursue the remedy of dismissal if a less 
harsh remedy would have alleviated any actual or anticipated prejudice. By foregoing 
these less harsh remedies, the defendant has waived any claim to relief under Rule 
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16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, because it is rare that a 
defendant is ever entitled to dismissal with prejudice as a remedy for prosecutorial 
misconduct, and because Judge Palmer's order of dismissal in response to the State's 
motion to dismiss without prejudice does not show any reason why it should be viewed 
as a dismissal with prejudice as is required by Rule 25(c), the Court should now reject 
the defendant's assertion that the State is barred, and allow this case to proceed to trial. 
DATED this < ^day of August, 1996. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
STEPHEN MERCER 
Deputy District Attorney 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
STEPHEN MERCER, Bar No. 6931 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN DIVISION II OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. 
) 
PAUL BURNINGHAM, Case No. 955039908TC 
) 
Defendant. Hon. LEE DEVER 
This matter having come before the Court on August 2, 1996, on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that further prosecution in this case is 
barred pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Court having 
considered the argument presented on behalf of the defendant by D. Bruce Oliver, and 
having considered the argument presented on behalf of the State by Stephen Mercer, 
and the Court declining the State's motion for reconsideration, the following findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and order are entered in writing as mandated by Rule 25 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 30, 1995, a criminal prosecution was commenced against the 
defendant relating to an allegation arising from conduct occurring on May 17, 1995. 
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The matter, which was issued the case number 955017625 TC, was assigned to Judge 
Phillip K. Palmer. 
2. On August 21, 1995, the defendant filed a motion for discovery. 
3. On October 23, 1995, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to 
compel discovery of a video tape which recorded the defendant's stop and arrest. 
Pursuant to that motion, the State was ordered to produce the tape within 5 days or the 
case would be dismissed. 
4. Having failed to obtain the tape from the arresting officer so that it could be 
provided as ordered, the State moved to dismiss this case on October 31, 1995. 
5. On November 1, 1995, Judge Palmer executed the order proposed by the 
State. That order was silent as to whether to dismissal was to be with or without 
prejudice. 
6. On November 29, 1995, the State refiled charges in this matter. The case 
was then issued case number 955039908 TC and assigned to this Court. 
7. On May 13, 1996, Bruce Oliver filed a memorandum of law in support of a 
motion to dismiss on the grounds of a bar pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. The 
defendant has sought dismissal as his only remedy since first complaining of a 
discovery violation. The defendant has never complained that the result of the 
discovery violation was a denial of his right to a speedy trial. 
8. On August 2, 1996, this Court conducted a hearing on the defendant's 
motion. During this hearing, in addition to contesting the defendant's assertion that the 
rules of civil procedure did not control, the State also argued that the defendant was 
never entitled to dismissal as a remedy for a discovery violation is some less sever 
remedy would redress the discovery violation. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure govern in criminal cases where 
there are no other applicable rules or statutes, Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (URCrP) governs the dismissal of criminal cases without trial, and therefore 
the defendant improperly looks outside of the URCrP for support of his motion to 
dismiss that case. 
2. Because the defendant does not properly rely on the rules of civil procedure 
in support of his motion, his demand for fees cannot be granted. 
3. Although the defendant has not argued that the effect of Judge Palmer's 
Order of Dismissal was with prejudice, because the State did not move to dismiss until 
after Judge Palmer's admonition to provide discovery within five days had expired, the 
effect of that order was the dismissal of this case with prejudice. 
ORDER 
As a result of the State's failure to provide discovery as originally ordered by 
Judge Palmer, this case is ordered dismissed with prejudice. 
BY THE COURT this day of October, 1996. 
LEE A. DEVER 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Counsel for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that an original and a copy of these proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of dismissal were provided to D. Bruce 
Oliver, counsel for the defendant, by mailing them to 180 South 300 West, Suite 210, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218, on this 2/ffi day of September, 1996. I further 
certify that a copy of this document has been filed with the court, and that the original 
is to be approved by counsel for the defendant within ten days of filing, or a duplicate 
original will be submitted to the court for adoption without the approval o£-the 
defendant. ~~ / 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
PAUL BURNINGHAM HEARING 
AUGUST 2, 1996 
15 min Oliver addresses Court 
28 min State addresses Court ("never entitled to dismissal" at 31 minutes) 
32 min Oliver again addresses Court 
35 min Court rules. Judge Lee Dever: 
"I think the appropriate place to look in determination of what it is going to be 
here is the orders that have been previously entered in case number 955017625. First of 
all, I agree with the State that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in this case 
because there are specific rules in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that apply and therefore 
they take precident over any civil rules because that's what the statute so provides. 
There's [sic] two issues here. Whether or not there should be a dismissal pursuant to rule 
16 or 25, as the case may be, the question really is whether a dismissal based on a court 
order can be deemed to be dismissal with prejudice in a criminal matter if it is not for 
grounds that are specifically provided for in the Rule. If you look at Rule 25, which is 
dismissal without trial, which I believe is what we are doing here—this is a dismissal 
without trial— it talks about if the dismissal is under certain grounds—unconstitutional 
delay or statute of limitations—it is a bar. However, it does not talk about whether it is a 
dismissal with prejudice, and therefore barred, if it is for other grounds. However, the 
Rule also provides that in its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, 
the Court may, of its own initiative, order it dismissed. The question is: Can the Court 
provide how the dismissal is to be? In this particular matter, the record indicates the 
plaintiff I mean the defendant in this matter, requested discovery on August 21, 1995, 
then on September 29, 1995, they wanted to look at the video. If by October 23, 1995, if 
the State had not made it available, the Court denied the motion for dismissal at that time, 
and stated that the State had five days to provide the tape, and stated on the docket that if 
the tape is not provided the case will be dismissed. The five days ordered by the Court ran 
on the 30th of October, either the fact that that was a weekend intervening, nothing was 
filed by the State at that time. On the 31st, the State filed the motion to dismiss. The 
question then becomes whether or not the State has the right to refile in this matter? It is 
my reading that underneath Rule 16 or Rule 25, that it is in the docket in this matter that 
the Court intended to order a dismissal in this case, and did order a dismissal. Giving the 
State three months in which to respond, I am going to order that my interpretation of this 
matter is that the case was dismissed and I will grant the defendant's motion in this matter 
to dismiss this matter in case number 955039908 and I'll order that it be dismissed with 
prejudice." 
"I don't believe the issue of fees is appropriate because it is handled under rules of 
civil procedure, therefore that motion, that request, is denied." 
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WEDNESDAY JUNE 5, 1996 
3:19 PM 
UHP Case: 955017625 TC 
Agency No.: RID95381 
BURNINGHAM, PAUL SERGE 
610 SOUTH 1ST EAST 
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010 
Traffic Court Case 
Judge: Philip K. Palmer 
NO OTN # FOR THIS CASE 
Charges 
Violation Date: 05/17/95 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 41-6-44 
Sev: MB Attrib: L, 
2. RED LIGHT VIOL 41-6-24 
Sev: MC 













05/30/95 Case filed on 05/30/95. 
ARR scheduled for 8/14/95 at 
PRE-TRIAL RELEASE AGREEMENT FILED 
06/05/95 D A NOTIFIED BY NOTICE OF ARR 
08/14/95 Mis Arraignment JUDGE: Philip K. 
TAPE: 1832 COUNT: 3041 
ATD: None Present PRO: 
Deft is present 
Information was read in court 
PTC scheduled for 08/25/95 at 0900 A in room ? with PKP 
Chrg: 41-6-44 Plea 
Chrg: 41-6-24 Plea 
Chrg: 53-3-227.S Plea 
DEFENDANT WILL HIRE BRUCE OLIVER 
08/16/95 FILED ANSWER TO REQUEST/MOTION FOR DISCOVERY 
08/22/95 JUDGE PALMER SIGNED MOTION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE 
PTC rescheduled to 9/11/95 at 9:00 A in room ? with PKP 
CLERK NOTIFIED ATD BRUCE OLIVER BY PHONE AND SENT COPY OF 
DOCKET ENTRY TO DIST ATTY 
08/23/95 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL (BRUCE OLIVER) PLEA OF NOT GUILTY 
AND DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL 
FILED REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
08/28/95 FILED MOTION AND ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE 
09/01/95 PALMER/KHB OFF TAPE C/O CLEAR DATE WITH ATD 
CLERK CALLED ATTY BRUCE OLIVER AND CLEARED DATE OF 9/29/95 AT 
2:00 PM WITH HIS SECRETARY 
CLERK NOTIFIED DIST ATTY BY SENDING A COPY OF THIS DOCKET ENTRY 
PTC rescheduled to 9/29/95 at 2:00 P in room ? with PKP 
09/29/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: Philip K. Palmer 
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WEDNESDAY JUNE 5, 1996 
3:19 PM 
UHP Case: 955017625 TC 
Agency No.: RID95381 
Traffic Court Case 
09/29/95 ATD: OLIVER, BRUCE PRO: BAKER, LARRY KHB 
PTC scheduled for 10/23/95 at 1100 A in room ? with PKP KHB 
ON MOTION OF DEF, C/O CONTINUE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE KHB 
DEF REPORTED THEY NEED TO LOOK AT VIDEO TAPE KHB 
10/23/95 Hearing (PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE): JUDGE: Philip K. Palmer KHB 
TAPE: 2361 COUNT: 650 KHB 
Deft Present KHB 
ATD: OLIVER, D BRUCE PRO: KISHNER, SHARON KHB 
MO CRIM scheduled for 11/06/95 at 0900 A in room ? with PKP KHB 
STATE HAS NOT MADE TAPE AVAILABLE - PROBLEMS GETTING FROM THE KHB 
OFFICER (OFFICER IS NOW IN PANGUITCH) KHB 
COURT DENIES DEF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AT THIS TIME KHB 
COURT GRANTS STATE MOTION FOR 5 DAYS TO PROVIDE TAPE TO DEF KHB 
O CONTINUE FOR MOTION HEARING, IF TAPE IS NOT PROVIDED THE KHB 
CASE WILL BE DISMISSED KHB 
D MOTION TO DISMISS DGP 
ENTERED ORDER OF DISMISSAL DGP 
CRIM on 11/ 6/95 was cancelled DGP 
ntered case disposition of: Dismissed DGP 
Chrg: 41-6-44 Fxnd: Dismissed DGP 
Chrg: 41-6-24 Find: Dismissed DGP 
Chrg: 53-3-227.S Find: Dismissed DGP 
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Additional Case Data 
Sentence Summary 
1. DUI 
2. RED LIGHT 
3. DRIVE ON SUSP LI 
Plea: Not Guilty 
Plea: Not Guilty 




Atty for Defendant 
OLIVER, D BRUCE 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST 
SUITE 260 





Home Phone: ( ) 
Work Phone: ( ) 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 04/20/63 
Dr. Lie. No.: 13229566 State: UT Expires: 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SHARON KISHNER, Bar No. 5741 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State, Room #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
Telephone: (801)468-3422 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





MOTION TO DISMISS 
CaseNo.955017625TC 
Hon. Philip K. Palmer 
SHARON KISHNER, attorney for plaintiff, moves this court for an order dismissing the 
above-entitled matter without prejudice, for the reason that as of this date, the State has been 
unable to produce the videotape of the incident. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 1995. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SHARON KISHNER 
Deputy District Attorney 
APPENDIX E 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SHARON KISHNER, Bar No. 5741 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State, Room #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1210 
Telephone: (801)468-3422 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 




) Hon. Philip K. Palmer 
Defendant. 
Based upon the motion of the Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the information in the above-entitled matter be 
dismissed. 
DATED this day of October, 1995. 
BYTHECOURT: 
PHILIP K. PALMER 
MAGISTRATE 
Note: The signed original order of dismissal was not available for duplication at the time 
of the preparation of this brief. 
APPENDIX F 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM, 
Defendant, 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 955039908 
Judge LEE DEVER 
Comes now the defendant above named by and through 
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and hereby moves this Court to dismiss 
this action against defendant based upon the Utah State 
Constitution Article I, section 12, the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 41, and the accompanying Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, which is incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of May, 1996. 
^e 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
\ / \ v-v 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL SERGE BURNINGHAM, 
Defendant, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 955039908 
Judge LEE DEVER 
Comes now the defendant above named by and through 
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and hereby submits the following 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to 
Dismiss, which Motion is incorporated herein by this reference. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol of May 17, 1995. 
2. That this case was originally filed before Judge 
Palmer. 
3. Defendant filed a Request for Discovery. 
4. At the time of the Pre-trial in this matter defendant 
requested a copy of the tape recording made at the time of the 
arrest of Defendant. 
5- That Judge Palmer ordered that the tape be provided to 
Defendant. 
6. That Defendant provided the prosecutor with a blank 
tape to make the copy. 
7. The State filed a Motion to Dismiss the action along 
with an Order to be signed by Judge Palmer. 
8. That the action was dismissed. 
9. That the prior case number was 955017652TC. 
ARGUMENT 
Both the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah provide that a person may not 
be placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Article I, 
section 12 of the Utah State Constitution provides as follows: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
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same offense, (emphasis added) 
Id, The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due 
process of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. (emphasis added) 
Id. Each of these provisions provides that once a person has 
been placed in jeopardy then that same person may not again be 
placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This is a well 
established point of law. 
In the current case Mr. Burningham has been placed in 
jeopardy and the case was dismissed. He has now been placed in 
jeopardy a second time for the same offense. This time it has 
been increased to a class A misdemeanor from a class B 
misdemeanor in front of Judge Palmer. The refiling of the case 
is extremely punitive. The prosecution of Mr. Burningham is 
barred by double jeopardy and therefore the case should be 
dismissed. 
This case is further barred by the fact that it was 
dismissed with prejudice and therefore may not be refiled again. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16 provides: 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
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shall disclose to the defense upon request the 
following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements 
of the defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree 
of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the 
court determines on good cause shown should be 
made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all 
disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as 
privileged, the defense shall disclose to the 
prosecutor such information as required by 
statute relating to alibi or insanity and any 
other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made 
available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the 
defense attorney shall make all disclosures 
at least ten days before trial or as soon as 
practicable. He has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably 
requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party 
that material and information may be 
inspected, tested or copied at specified 
reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court 
may at any time order that discovery or 
inspection be denied, restricted, or 
deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the 
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court may permit the party to make such 
showing, in whole or in part, in the form of 
a written statement to be inspected by the 
judge alone. If the court enters an order 
granting relief following such an ex parte 
showing, the entire text of the party's 
statement shall be sealed and preserved in 
the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an 
appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of 
the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has 
failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery 
or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence 
not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
Id. In this rules it allows and permits discovery to be had 
between the parties. The Court is allowed the discretion to 
determine the limits of the discovery. The Court is further 
allowed to set out the consequences of a parties failure to 
participate in discovery or for failure to comply with the 
Court's Order concerning discovery. In the current case both 
parties were advised by the Court on October 23, 1995 that the 
case would be dismissed if indeed the tape was not produced to 
defendant. On October 31, 1995 the State filed a Motion to 
Dismiss. On that same date Judge Palmer entered his Order of 
Dismissal. This is all in accordance with the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure Rule 16. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 81 (e) provides as 
follows: 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules 
shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, 
except insofar as such rules are by their nature 
clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for 
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procedure by reference to any part of the former 
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be 
in accordance with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall 
not apply to proceedings in uncontested probate 
and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all 
proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue 
therein, including the enforcement of any judgment 
or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. 
These rules shall apply to civil actions commenced 
in the city or justice courts, except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order 
of an administrative board or agency. These rules 
shall apply to the practice and procedure in 
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, 
ruling or other action of an administrative board 
or agency, except insofar as the specific 
statutory procedure in connection with any such 
appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent 
with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These 
rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect 
of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any 
rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Id. Subsection (e) provides that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply to criminal matters at any time when they are not 
is specific conflict with any other provision or are 
unconstitutional. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 41 
provides as follows: 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any 
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by 
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing 
a notice of dismissal at any time before service 
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion 
for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
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stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action• Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall 
not be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal 
under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a 
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in 
an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, 
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon 
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If 
the court renders judgment on the merits against 
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule 
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule 
shall be made before a responsive pleading is 
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served or, if there is none, before the 
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the 
court may make such order for the payment of costs 
of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action 
until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse 
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a 
provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such 
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by 
the court to the adverse party against whom such 
provisional remedy was obtained. (emphasis added) 
Id. In the current case the dismissal of the action was by the 
plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss. In the Order prepared by the 
plaintiff there is no reference to the dismissal being without 
prejudice. This would mean that the dismissal was with prejudice 
and on the merits. Understanding that the matter has been 
dismissed on the merits it is inappropriate that this matter be 
refiled. The law of the case is that the case has been 
dismissed. Defendant is entitled to the application of res 
judicata, or double jeopardy or both. If the State is free to 
refile then at a minimum the threat of Judge Palmer to dismiss 
for failure to comply with discovery orders is hollow and without 
substance. 
Further the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 41 provide that the party refiling an action after previous 
dismissal should pay the costs of the prior case for the opposing 
party. This would be appropriate if indeed the Court permits 
this matter to go forward. In the alternative if this Court 
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agrees with defendant then sanctions pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are in order and those sanctions should be 
commensurate with the cost to the defendant of the second case. 
This matter should be dismissed and no further action taken by 
the State. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to dismiss this action. 
Defendant has twice been put in jeopardy since the first action 
was dismissed with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to: Salt Lake District 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Dated this / T"t day of May, 1996, 
CfUftJiSh M ( 
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